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Microcosms and macrocosms
Dialogical Self theory (Hermans, 2001) is one of 
the most successful approaches of the last decade in the 
study of Self. Its prompt diffusion it is probably due to its 
characteristic of being a long-range theory, able to account 
for several aspects of “normal” and “pathological” psycho-
logical phenomena. The strong theoretical assumption of is 
the conception of the mind as a microcosm of the society, 
a dynamic multiplicity of relatively autonomous positions 
in dialogue (Hermans, 2014). Positions evolve through an 
internalization of significant others’ and culture’s voices, 
that become the cast or repertoire of an inner drama, what 
could be called the novel of our life. In some recent ad-
vancements of the theory, Hermans (2014) is trying to 
explicitly link the microcosm of Self’s arena with the mac-
rocosm of society. This link is operated by defining three 
different levels of positioning: the internal domain of the 
self, made of internalized voices; the external domain, of 
the Self, in which significant others are positioned, form-
ing the “society of Self” (Hermans, 2014); and the societal 
domain in which real individual, institutions and cultures 
dialogue with the Self. This could be considered a wise 
theoretical move to include a more ecological model of Self 
in society, in which the dynamics of positioning (e.g. colla-
tions, asymmetries, power relationships, alliance, etc.) can 
echo the wider societal dynamics, accounting for the role 
of cultures and sub-cultures in the formation and elabora-
tion of the Self system. It is a very intriguing development, 
since only Freud’s theory, in my humble opinion, probably 
provided such a global account for the relationship be-
tween profound dynamics of the psychological life and the 
societal forces that in actual fact shape individual experi-
ences and life trajectories.
In many of the articles of this special issue, I can read 
a specific attention to the relationship between the development 
of the Self system and the societal challenges at large. That is 
why I would like to point at some potential research directions 
and topics that could revive the concept of Dialogical Self.
The new developments of Dialogical Self Theory 
try explicitly to grasp the implications of the identity-alterity 
problem in present times when multiplication and globaliza-
tion of subjects is posing new questions. I would say that 
the Hearth’s overpopulating and multiplication of migration 
flows is jeopardizing the microcosm with respect to a poten-
tial overpopulation of the society of Self system. In this con-
text, the issues of development and education become central. 
Indeed, we still know little about the way the internal domain 
of self develops in specific periods of life, e.g. the period from 
infancy to adolescence, with respect to the evident presence 
of the external domain, the adults, in relation to the larger 
societal challenges of the alterity in a globalized world.
For instance, Simão and Sánchez, in this special is-
sue, focus on the relationship between identity and alterity 
in infancy through an empirical study on the community 
of Colombian Indigenous people Nonam. In this article, the 
dialogical space is conceptualized as ego-alter-world rela-
tionship (Simão, 2012). The study shows the importance of 
not focusing just on the lowest level of symbolic analysis (no 
matter if more or less quantitative or interpretative study of 
linguistic utterances) but on complex products of human ac-
tivity such as myths and social practices. In this case, the 
process of elaboration of the Self system during infancy is 
studied in the context of the activity of myth narratives that 
takes place between mothers and children of the Indigenous 
community. This is a very important point to stress, if the 
object of psychological science is the dynamic relationship 
between the ego, the alterity and the societal context, then, 
as the Danish psychologist and philosopher Harald Höffding 
(1905) elegantly expressed more than one century ago: 
Abstract: The commentary presents an epistemological reflection about Dialogical Self theory. First, the theoretical 
issues of DS about the relationship between individuality, alterity and society are discussed, elaborating on the 
articles of this special issue. Then, it is presented the argument of psychologist’s ontological fallacy, that is the attitude 
to moving from the study of processes to the study of psychological entities. Finally a development toward new 
research directions is proposed, focusing on the study of higher psychological functions and processes, taking into 
account complex symbolic products of human activity and developing psychological imagination. 
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If we want to find out the elements and laws of 
mental life it is not enough to study the single indi-
vidual in its special states. A study is also required 
of human works and ideals, in which the nature of 
mental life is revealed throughout the ages. There 
exists no mental life in general. It appears in dif-
ferent forms at different times and places, and it 
strives to develop itself as fully as possible in every 
one of these forms, though the totality of its ele-
ments has a different timbre in every special case. 
(Höffding, p. 76)
Simão and Sánchez also stress a hot spot of psycho-
logical epistemology. One cannot abstract from the con-
crete situation in which people and researcher interaction 
in the context of the research. It often treated as a suspend-
ed state in which the dialogical dynamics of the encoun-
ter with alterity are simply neglected (by the researcher). 
The research is nothing but a special case of the dialogical 
space in which all the participants play their drama (Tateo 
& Marsico, 2014). Thus, Simão and Sánchez remind us to 
adopt the same systemic gaze, considering the relationship 
between the researcher and the participants as developing 
process that implies the qualitative change of both the sub-
ject and the object of knowledge.
The form of alterity par excellence that a person 
can experience in his own life is the divinity, which is an-
other context of the human activity in which the micro 
and the micro, the inner and the outer which can be an 
interesting field of application for Dialogical Self theory 
(Valsiner, 2007). 
In Religion men have made some of their deepest 
and most intensive mental experiences. If religion is 
genuine and original, all the elements of mental life 
are at work in it with an energy and interplay not 
to be found in any other domain. The study of reli-
gious life is therefore of great importance to general 
psychology. (Höffding, 1905, p. 77)
In religious experience, which is such a relevant part 
of everyday life for a large part of the population in coun-
tries like Brazil, the Self system is dealing with extremely 
hyper-generalized I-positions, including the divinity and 
the community of believers. The person develops what 
Hermans (2014) calls meta-positions that play the function 
of managing the unity of the society of self in presence 
of very demanding, sometimes controversial and valued 
voices. The relationship between the internal, external and 
societal domains is particularly interesting in religious 
experience because people must keep together a sense of 
external force, the divinity, with the need of maintaining a 
high personal integrity and at the same time answering the 
many questions posed by the community of co-believers. 
The third relevant domain that can present new in-
teresting challenges to the development of Dialogical Self 
Theory is that of artistic expression. Art is multidimensional 
dialogical space, including very complex symbolic produc-
tions and relationships between the artist Self system and 
the audience. Very interestingly, psychology has failed 
to develop a general theory of artistic experience, so far 
(Tateo, 2016). The role of art in the promotion of social 
change (Awad & Wagoner, 2015) and in the development 
of the personal life trajectory raises many interesting is-
sues: shall we always consider the Self system as dialogical 
and polyphonic? In this case, what happens to monological 
aspects of the Self? Or, is instead more fruitful to look at 
the process of alternation between dialogical and monolog-
ical spaces, not just considering the monological aspects 
as superimposed by the oppressive pressure of the societal 
dynamics? Monological discourse is always present every 
time we silence the voice of alterity, not letting the other 
enter our dialogical space. Of course, it is easier to observe 
this phenomenon according to the distribution of power 
within the society. Going back to the field of education, it 
is easier for a teacher to produce a monological discourse 
than for a pupil or for a majority group over a minority. 
Nevertheless, as shown in the case art, as for instance in 
the context of the graffiti people (Awad & Wagoner, 2015), 
a monological discourse, in which the other is radically left 
out as irreducible to my dialogical space, can also occur 
as a form of resistance in a situation of marginality. One 
can use the graffiti as a form of identity expression and 
appropriation of a public space one is usually excluded 
from. But one can do this either by aiming at construct-
ing a common dialogical space, or by replacing the former 
occupant. These are the alternatives between co-habiting 
and colonizing a dialogical space, which is a very issue in 
contemporary society. 
The ontological fallacy
Considering the Dialogical Self theory, we should 
avoid falling into a tendency that has always been present 
in the history of psychology. Paraphrasing William James 
(1950), I would call it the psychologist’s ontological fallacy. 
The Dialogical Self is a powerful metaphorical description 
of a process in which through symbolic action the triadic 
relationship between the self, the alterity and the society 
mutually co-generates, co-develop through differentiation 
and mutual recognition. In this sense, monologicality is not 
the refusal of alterity rather the lack of recognition. On the 
other hand, psychology often deals with non-existing ob-
jects (Valsiner, 2014), such as mind, culture, intelligence, 
identity, self system, personality traits to mention but few. 
It is often neglected that these constructs are theoretical 
elaborations build to understand processes, but soon or 
later they become things through the symbolic artifacts 
that the discipline develops to measure and talk about them 
(Tateo, 2013). When a process is reified into a thing, loses is 
attributes of dynamicity and multidimensionality. A thing 
instead acquires properties, parts and features that can be 
measured, it also acquires causality relationships, things do 
things. Reification is basically a conceptual and linguistic 
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inside the mind that can be mapped and measured with the 
right apparatus. The concrete risk is to transform an active 
process of elaboration, with his history and situated-ness, 
into small people inside the mind, like in the trope of bad 
angel and good angel. On the other hand, the presence of 
this trope in several historical contexts and literary prod-
ucts was used by Bakhtin as a powerful theoretical tool 
to study the processes of authorship. The same problem is 
posed in the reification of the alterity. As in the case of 
global migrations, one can start by defining alterity as a 
thing, a stable property of the individual – e.g. the stranger, 
the Muslim, etc. – and then using it to explain individual 
behaviors by the essence of being Alter.
This raises another question that is mentioned also 
by Simão and Sánchez in their article. If Dialogical Self is 
the abstract description of a process, rather than a struc-
tural organization of I-positions, how do we deal with the 
problem of subjectivity and agency? In other words, how 
can be a process responsible for the actions, thoughts and 
feelings that we naturally attribute to a person?
The psychological imagination
A way of looking at the relationship between sub-
jectivity and multivocality is again that of considering sub-
jectivity not as a thing but as a process. I will here discuss 
the point of view that psychological processes are funda-
mentally egocentric and ethnocentric. I shall go back again 
to Vico’s philosophy. He stated that the origin of any ex-
perience is the embodied experience of the world (Tateo, 
2015). We cannot escape the primary perspective from 
which we see the world which is the self-centered gaze 
from the inside to the outside (Benson, 2000) and into an 
irreversible directionality of life time. This is the funda-
mentally egocentric perspective from which both the sense 
of self and of alterity originates. At the same time, our per-
spective cannot be but ethnocentric, in the sense that we 
experience the world through the mediation of culture. The 
problem of the relationship between identity and alterity 
must start from the point that the Self is an ethnocentric 
process (Boesch, 1991). This also implies a relativization 
and a decentralization of the psychological sciences’ per-
spective. “Psychologists, as well as social scientists, should 
indeed think well before finishing any sentences the sub-
ject of which is ‘man’”. (Wright Mills, 1959, p. 163). The 
greatest danger for psychology is indeed to talk about dia-
logicality from a monological point of view. 
Three Centuries ago, Vico already warned us to re-
flect upon the ethnocentrism of every form of knowledge, 
looking in a different way to the process of generalization 
of psychological knowledge (Tateo, 2015). “What social 
science is properly about is the human variety, which con-
sists of all the social worlds in which men have lived, are 
living, and might live”. (Wright Mills, 1959, p. 132). The 
articles of this special issue stress a particular focus on de-
velopment and perspective dimensions of the Self system. 
They grasp the dialogical space as a place for potential 
operation of abstraction that transforms processes into their 
outcomes (Tateo, 2015). Thus, when culture as conceptual 
tool to understand a process becomes an non-existing ob-
ject, it acquires the capability to cause some outcomes and 
can be than used to explain phenomena, like in the case 
of cross-cultural psychology, in which culture becomes a 
variable to explain individual variability. The same can be 
observed with concepts like personality. Once we reify it, 
distinguishing it in parts, the personality traits that can be 
measured as stable entities, then personality can be used 
to explain further phenomena or behaviors. Besides, as the 
17th Century philosopher Giambattista Vico, one of the an-
cestors of cultural psychology, claimed, it is fundamental 
to look at the historical and concrete conditions in which 
psychological processes take place, but also to the consid-
eration of the whole, from its genesis to its transformation 
in something different (Tateo, 2015). The process of reifi-
cation swipes off the historical dimension of psychological 
processes. If one considers intelligence, for instance, as a 
thing that can be measured, it loses any genetic dimension, 
as well as the fact that cognition, affection and action are 
always parts of a whole, and they are an action upon the sit-
uation. Probably few scholars such as Vygotsky, Piaget and 
Lewin understood to what extent experiencing is always 
changing, because the relationship between mind, alterity 
and culture is co-generative. 
I see a similar risk with some applications of 
Dialogical Self theory, that is to become a modern version 
of the ancient theme of Psychomachia (battle of spirits), 
which is present from the very origins of Christian and 
Islamic traditions (Figure 1) and is still a very popular 
trope also in contemporary cultural products. 
Figure 1. Two Angels, with a Man in the Middle Charged 
to Write Down his Good and Bad Deeds, (author Zakari-
ya ibn Muhammad Qazwini, 1717 a. C.), Creative Com-
mon Licence, Walter Museum 2014
The threat is to transform a process – the polyphonic 
and dynamic symbolic internalization and externalization 
through which the person is organizing the relationship 
with the others and the cultural context – into a thing, a 
reification of the different I-positions into stable entities 
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the ideals and points of view which are revealed in 
this development may be understood by the help of 
general psychological laws. (Höffding, 1905, p. 76)
This implies, in my understanding, that the pos-
sibilities of development for the Dialogical Self Theory 
consist in the focus on developmental and future oriented 
processes of the Self system. It means that the imaginative 
processes and the creative aspect must be always carefully 
considered (Tateo, 2016).
development rather than a structured organization of static 
positions. This is what the psychological imagination can 
help as the faculty of linking past, present and future in the 
process of understanding. But this cannot be done without 
focusing on complex phenomena and processes: 
We cannot deduce pedagogics, aesthetics and prac-
tical ethics from psychology- But we can observe 
the spontaneous development of the art of educa-
tion, of aesthetic production and of ethical life, and 
Imaginação psicológica
Resumo: O comentário apresenta uma reflexão epistemológica sobre a teoria do Self Dialógico. Inicialmente, são discutidas 
questões teóricas da TSD sobre a relação entre individualidade, alteridade e sociedade, elaboradas com base nos artigos que 
constam desse número especial. Em seguida, discute-se o argumento da falácia ontológica, ou seja, a atitude de se desviar 
do estudo do processo para estudar entidades psicológicas. Por fim, propõe-se o desenvolvimento em direção a novas 
possibilidades de pesquisa, com foco no estudo das funções e dos processos psicológicos superiores, levando em consideração 
os produtos simbólicos complexos da atividade humana e a imaginação psicológica em desenvolvimento.
Palavras-chave: funções psicológicas superiores, falácia ontológica da psicologia, self dialógico, imaginação psicológica.
L’imagination psychologique
Résumé: Le commentaire présente une réflexion épistémologique sur la Théorie du Soi Dialogique. Tout d’abord, ils sont 
abordées les questions théoriques de la DS sur la relation entre l’individualité, l’altérité et la société, en élaborant sur les articles 
dans ce numéro spécial. Ensuite, on présente l’argument de le sophisme ontologique des psychologues, à savoir la passage de 
l’étude des processus à l’étude des entités psychologiques. On propose enfin un développement vers des nouvelles directions 
de recherche, en se concentrant sur l’étude des fonctions et des processus psychologiques supérieurs, tout en tenant compte 
des produits symboliques complexes de l’activité humaine et le développement de l’imagination psychologique.
Mots-clés: fonctions psychologiques supérieures, erreur ontologique du psychologue, Dialogical Self, imagination 
psychologique.
La imaginación psicológica
Resumen: Este texto presenta una reflexión epistemológica sobre la teoría del Self Dialógico. En primer lugar, se discuten las 
cuestiones de esta teoría sobre la relación entre individualidad, alteridad y sociedad, desarrollando las ideas articuladas en los 
artículos en este número especial. A continuación, se presenta el argumento de la falacia ontológica de los psicólogos, que es 
la actitud de pasar del estudio de los procesos al estudio de las entidades psicológicas. Finalmente se propone un desarrollo de 
nuevas formas de investigación, centrándose en el estudio de las funciones y los procesos psicológicos superiores, teniendo en 
cuenta los productos simbólicos complejos de la actividad humana y el desarrollo de la imaginación psicológica. 
Palabras clave: funciones psicológicas superiores, falacia ontológica del psicólogo, Self Dialógico, imaginación psicológica.
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